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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Civil Procedure-Deposition and Discovery-Availability of
Adversary's File Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure
Is the material gathered by an attorney in anticipation of or in
preparation for trial a proper subject of discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure?1 Since the Federal Rules were promul-
gated, the answers to this question have been plentiful and greatly
diverse. By result, of course, they fall into two groups: (1) discovery
denied, (2) discovery allowed.
128 U. S. C. A. following §72 3c.
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Three reasons have been advanced for denying discovery: (1) The
material sought would be only "hearsay" and not admissible in evi-
dence.2  (2) Allowing discovery would penalize careful and thorough
preparation and put a premium on laziness.8 (3) The material gath-
ered by an attorney in preparation for trial is privileged and, therefore,
excluded from discovery.4 The second and third reasons overlap. To
avoid expanding "privilege," it seems that some courts adopted the sec-
ond reason.
The courts allowing discovery have rejected each of these reasons
at one time or another. The admissibility in evidence as a test has been
completely rejected. 5 To place the issue beyond question, the Supreme
Court has approved6 a proposed amendment to Rule 26(b) which reads:
"It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible
at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence."
Though considerable weight has been given to the argument that to
allow discovery would be unfair, penalize the diligent, and put a pre-
mium on laziness,7 it has been ably pointed out that the public interest in
having all the facts of cases ascertained by the court outweighs this
argument.8 It would seem that this squarely answers the argument with
2 i re Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, 3 F. R. D. 171 (S. D. N. Y. 1942) ;
Matthies v. Peter F. Connolly Co., 2 F. R. D. 277 (E. D. N. Y. 1941); Maryland,
for Use of Montvila, v. Pan-American Bus Lines, 1 F. R. D. 213 (D. Md. 1940) ;
Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F. R. D. 215 (W. D. Mo. 1940); Rose Silk Mills,
Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 29 F. Supp. 504 (S. D. N. Y. 1939);
Kenealy v. Texas Co., 29 F. Supp. 502 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Sonken-Galamba Corp.
et a. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. et al., 30 F. Supp. 936 (W. D. Mo. 1939) ; Sly-
dell v. Capital Transit Co., 1 F. R. D. 15 (D. C. 1939).3 Sano Petroleum Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 3 F. R. D. 467 (E. D. N. Y. 1944);
Stark v. American Dredging Co., 3 F. R. D. 300 (E. D. Pa. 1943) ; Courteau v.
Interlake S. S. Co. et al., 1 F. R. D. 525 (W. D: Mich. 1941); Stern et al. v.
Exposition Greyhound, 1 F. R. D. 696 (E. D. N. Y. 1941); Conneway v. City of
New York, 32 F. Supp. 54 (E. D. N. Y. 1940) ; McCarthy v. Palmer et al., 29 F.
Supp. 585 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Murphy v. New York & Porto Rico S. S. Co., 27
F. Supp. 878 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
'Walling v. J. Friedman & Co. et al., 4 F. R. D. 384 (S. D. N. Y. 1944);
Sano Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 3 F. R. D. 467 (E. D. N. Y. 1944) ; Byers
Theaters, Inc. v. Murphy, 1 F. R. D. 286 (W. D. Va. 1940) ; see Colpak et al. v.
Hetterick et a!., 40 F. Supp. 350 (E. D. N. Y. 1941).
'Hercules Powder Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 3 F. R. D. 302 (D. Del. 1943);
Blank v. Great Northern Ry., 4 F. R. D. 213 (D. Minn. 1943); Hoffman v.
Palmer et al., 129 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Mackerer v. New York
Cent. R. R., 1 F. R. D. 408 (E. D. N. Y. 1940).
'Pursuant to 28 U. S. C. A. §723c, the proposed amendments were approved
by the Supreme Court and transmitted to the Attorney General who reported them
to Congress- at the beginning of the 80th regular session. By Rule 86 these
amendments will become effective on the day which is three months subsequent to
the adjournment of the first regular session, but, if that day is prior to September
1, 1947, then these amendments will become effective on September 1, 1947. Amend-
ments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 F. R. D. 229, 249, 91 L. ed. 380, 391
( 1947).(.2 MooRE's F-zEUL PRAcncE (1946 Cure. Supp.) §26.12, p. 162.
'Hoffman v. Palmer et a!., 129 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) ; Seligson v.
Camp Westover, 1 F. R. D. 738 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
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the exception of the expense involved in the preparation for trial. The
proposed amendment to Rule 30(b) would add expense as a basis for a
court order protecting the parties or deponents.0 The Supreme Court
did not accept this amendment, but it would seem that protection from
expense may be included within a liberal interpretation of "oppression"
as now provided in Rule 30(b).
On the matter of privilege some distinctions have been drawn between
agents of insurance companies and attorneys. The argument of privi-
lege has been rejected as to insurance investigators, 10 even though the
results of the investigation have been turned over to an attorney." Some
courts have restricted privilege to its evidential meaning and have al-
lowed examination of an adversary's file.12  It has been held generally
that reports made in the regular course of business are subject to
discovery. 13
Against this background of inconsistent, diverse, and confusing
answers to this important question, the recent case of Hickman v. Tay-
lor et al.14 becomes very significant. This was an action for death of
plaintiff's decedent. The death occurred from drowning after the sink-
ing of defendants' tug under unusual circumstances. The plaintiff served
interrogatories on the tug owners and asked in the thirty-eighth inter-
rogatory that the statements of all crew members be attached, or, if oral,
be set forth in detail. Defendants and defendants' counsel refused to
answer said thirty-eighth interrogatory. The District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting en banc, found the question
proper and ordered both the defendant tug owners and their counsel
Mr. Fortenbaugh to answer said interrogatory and to "produce all
written statements of witnesses obtained by Mr. Fortenbaugh, as counsel
and agent for Defendants; state in substance any fact concerning this
case which Defendants learned through oral statements made by wit-
nesses to Mr. Fortenbaugh whether or not included in his private
memoranda and produce Mr. Fortenbaugh's memoranda containing
'Advisory Committee Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, June 1946 (Government Printing Office, Washington: 1946), p. 39, 5
F. R. D. 433, 456 (1946).
" Kulich v. Murray et a[., 28 F. Supp. 675 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Bough et al.
v. Lee et al., 28 F. Supp. 673 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
" Blank v. Great Northern Ry., 4 F, R. D. 213 (D. Minn. 1943); Colpak et al.
v. Hetterick et al., 40 F. Supp. 350 (E. D. N. Y. 1941); Price v. Levitt et al.,
29 F. Supp. 164 (E. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Bough et al. v. Lee et al., 29 F. Supp. 498
(S. D. N. Y. 1939).
"'Leach v. Greif Bros. Cooperage Corp., 2 F. R. D. 444 (S. D. Miss. 1942);
Kane v. News Syndicate Co., Inc. et al., 1 F. R. D. 738 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
"
3 Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 6 F. R. D. 219 (N. D. Cal. 1946) ; Dowd v.
American S. S. Co., 5 F. R. D. 240 (W. D. N. Y. 1945); Eiseman v. Pennsyl-
vania R. R., 3 F. R. D. 338 (E. D. Pa. 1944); Stark v. American Dredging Co.,
3 F. R. D. 300 (E. D. Pa. 1943); Kane v. News Syndicate Co., Inc. et al., 1
F. R. D. 738 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
" - U. S. -, 67 Sup. Ct. 385, 91 L. ed. 330 (1947).
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. statements of fact by witnesses or to submit these memoranda to the
Court for determination of those portions which should be revealed to
Plaintiff."15 Upon refusal, the defendants and defendants' counsel were
adjudged in contempt.' The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, also sitting en banc, found the material sought to be privileged
and reversed the judgment of contempt.' 7 It should be noted, however,
that the court expressly rejected the argument that to allow discovery
would be unfair and would penalize the diligent and put a premium on
laziness.' 8 The importance of the problem and the great diversity of
views among the district courts led to a grant of certiorari.10
Though the proper procedure was not followed by the plaintiff,20
the court recognized that the rules create integral procedural devices
and took up the question on its merits. The reversal of the district court
was unanimously affirmed, but not on the basis of privilege. While the
scope is not delineated, the court expressly excludes from privilege in-
formation an attorney secures from witnesses, memoranda, briefs, or
other writings prepared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting his
client's case, and writings which reflect an attorney's mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories. 21
The basis of the court's decision is that no party as a matter of right
can have discovery of the files and mental impressions of the opposing
party's counsel. Relevant and non-privileged facts are not to remain
hidden in counsel's files, but to inquire into them it must be shown that
denial of such production would unduly prejudice the preparation of
petitioner's case or cause him hardship or injustice. The problem is
to balance the two extremes-the degree of privacy essential to the
effective work of a lawyer, and the reasonable and necessary inquiries
supported by public policy.
This problem has been a source of great controversy among the
members of the bar. The Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Pro-
cedure recognized the unsatisfactory state of the district court decisions.
After leaving the matter entirely at the discretion of the court in the
" Id. at - , 67 Sup. Ct. at 388, 91 L. ed. at 333.
" Hickman v. Taylor et al., 4 F. R. D. 479 (1945).
"
7Hickman v. Taylor et a[., 153 F. (2d) 212 (1945).
" "Nor do we balk at the notion that the hare may by discovery avail himself
of the diligence of the tortoise." Id. at 219.
" Cert. denied, - U. S. - , 66 Sup. Ct. 961, 90 L. ed. 848 (1946), but
granted on rehearing, - U. S. - , 66 Sup. Ct. 1337, 90 L. ed. 1068 (1946).
"' Petitioner thought that he was proceeding under Rule 33. The district court
based its order on both Rules 33 and 34. The circuit court of appeals found that
Rule 26 was the principal rule involved, though it recognized that Rule 33 was
involved as far as the defendants were concerned. The Supreme Court states
that the proper procedure would be to take the defendants' attorney's deposition
under Rule 26 and to attempt to force production of the material by a subpoena
duces tecuon under Rule 45.2 - U. S. - , - , 67 Sup. Ct. 385, 392, 91 L. ed. 330, 337 (1947).
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preliminary draft,22 the committee submitted the following proposed
amendment to the Supreme Court:
"The court shall not order the production or inspection of any
writing obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney,
surety, indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in
preparation for trial unless satisfied that denial of production or
inspection will unfairly prejudice the party seeking the produc-
tion or inspection in preparing his claim or defense or will cause
him undue hardship or injustice. The court shall not order the
production or inspection of any part of the writing that 'reflects
an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories, or, except as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of
an expert.128
After spirited debate, both the Assembly and the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association in convention at Atlantic City voted
their opposition to this amendment as proposed.24 The committee on
the Bill of Rights of the Association filed a brief amicus curiae uphold-
ing the decision of the circuit court of appeals. 25 The brief requested
the court not to act on the proposed amendment until the bar as a whole
had an opportunity to reach a more satisfactory solution.
The Supreme Court did not promulgate the proposed amendment to
Rule 30(b). They found the amendment unnecessary. In the major-
ity opinion Mr. Justice Murphy said:
"But the general policy against invading the privacy of an at-
torney's course of preparation is so well recognized and so essen-
tial to an orderly working of our system of legal procedure that a
burden rests on the one who would invade that privacy to establish
adequate reasons to justify production through a subpoena or
court order. That burden, we believe, is necessarily implicit in
the rules as now constituted.
"Rule 30(b), as presently written, gives the trial judge the
requisite discretion to make a judgment as to whether discovery
should be allowed as to written statements of witnesses."'
The court feels that forcing the production of oral statements made to
an attorney would greatly lower the standards of the profession.
In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Jackson points out that even
though a literal interpretation of the rules would permit the result
reached by the district court, all the history of discovery would deny
this result. "Certainly nothing in the tradition or practice of discovery
22Armstrong, Advisory Committee Recommendations, 66 F. Supp. Advance
Sheet No. 3, Sept. 2, 1946, XIX at XXXV.
" Committee report, cited supra note 9; also id. at XXXVI.(1947) 33 A. B. A. J. 149.(1946) 32 A. B. A. J. 882.
'- q. S. - , - , 67 Sup. Ct. 385, 394, 91 L. ed. 330, 339 (1947).
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up .to the time of these Rules would have suggested that they would
authorize such a practice as here proposed.
27
A strong argument has been made for amending Rule 30(b) to the
effect that no court shall order the production or inspection of any
writing obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety,
indemnitor, or agent in anticipation or litigation or in preparation for
trial.2 3 Such an amendment would seem to provide a means of hiding
relevant and non-privileged facts in the investigator's file. This result
would clearly defeat the purpose of a judicial trial. The attorney held
in contempt in the Hickman case has suggested that the court should
distinguish between the objective facts and the subjective facts. 20 The
objective facts should be produced no matter where they may be found.
The subjective facts represent the work of counsel on the objective
facts-the so-called "work product of a lawyer," and should be pro-
tected from discovery.
The general objection raised to leaving the matter within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge is that under the pressure of an overloaded
docket of motions and trials the court will tend to establish a set rule
and allow all discovery motions or deny all of them.3 0 This objection
hardly seems sound. Since the promulgation of the Rules, a showing
of "good cause" has been required for a production of original doc-
uments under Rule 34. Any attempt to avoid the exercise of the dis-
cretion of the trial judge may very well be an attempt to restrict justice
by eliminating the consideration of the facts peculiar to each case.
The question is not yet settled. In summary, the present situation
may be described as follows:
1. By the proposed amendment to Rule 26(b) the argument that
the matter sought by deposition is not admissible in evidence is no
longer a valid reason for denying discovery.31
2. By the Supreme Court's decision in the Hickman case the plea
of privilege is clearly restricted to privilege as the term applies in
evidence.
3. The privacy essential to the effective work of an attorney makes
it necessary for a party to show "good cause" before discovery of an
adversary's file will be permitted.
"Good cause" will undoubtedly vary with the presiding judge. Like
"due process," it may be best to define "good cause" only "by the grad-
27Id. at - , 67 Sup. Ct. at 397, 91 L. ed. at 343 (1947).28Discovery Procedure Symposium, 5 F. R. D. 403 et seq.91d. at 410.
'
0 Id. at 415; 2 Mooaa's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1946 Cum. Supp.) §26.12, p. 164.31By the proposed amendments which have been approved by the Supreme
Court and submitted to Congress the scope of the examination under Rule 26(b)




ual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented
for decision may require." 32 In the Hickman case the court has by dic-
tum included a situation where the witnesses are no longer available
or can be reached only with difficulty,33 and by inference it has excluded
a situation where all of the witnesses are employees of the opposing
party. Whether or not in a specific case an attorney will be forced to
reveal his files is at the present writing unknown. If the court finds
"good cause" the Supreme Court's answer apparently is "yes"; if no
"good cause" is found, the answer is "no."
The result would seem to be that a district judge may find "good
cause," a circuit court of appeals may find no "good cause" and the
ultimate decision will rest with the Supreme Court as to whether or not
"good cause" exists. While such a situation may be undesirable, it
would seem to be unavoidable, if the sanctity of an attorney's files is
to be invaded or not depending on the existence of "good cause."
WILLiAm A. DExS, JR.
Civil Procedure-Service of Process-Suability of Unincorporated
Associations in North Carolina
North Carolina has consistently followed the common law rule that,
in the absence of an enabling statute, an unincorporated association has
no capacity to sue or to be sued in its common name; for the reason
that, in the absence of statutes recognizing it, such association has no
legal entity apart from that of its members.1
In 1943, the General Assembly of North Carolina, by amendment
to G. S. 1-97, added subsection (6), which provides, in part: "Any unin-
corporated association or organization, whether resident or nonresident,
desiring to do business in this state by performing any of the acts for
which it was formed, shall.., appoint an agent in this state upon whom
all processes and precepts may be served .... If said unincorporated
association or organization shall fail to appoint the process agent pur-
suant to this subsection, all precepts and processes may be served upon
the secretary of state of North Carolina .... Service upon the process
agent appointed pursuant to this subsection... shall be legal and bind-
ing on said association.., and any judgment recovered in any action...
2 Mr. Justice Miller in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 (1877).
" Hickman v. Taylor et al., - U. S. , -, 67 Sup. Ct. 385, 394, 91
L. ed. 330, 339 (1947).
'Hallman v. The Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers' International Union et al.,
219 N. C. 798, 15 S. E. (2d) 723 (1941); Citizens' Co. v. Typographical Union,
187 N. C. 42, 121 S. E. 31 (1924) ; Tucker v. Eatough, 186 N. C. 505, 120 S. E. 57
(1923) noted (1932), 10 N. C. L. REv. 313; Kerr v. Hicks, 154 N. C. 265, 70 S. E.
468 (1911); Nelson v. Relief Department, 147 N. C. 103, 60 S. E. 724 (1908);
but see Winchester v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 203 N. C. 735, 167 S. E.
49 (1932).
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